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PERCY INGERMAN
(1936-19!lt)
BERNARD C.
SMITH
(19x9-1993) |

STATE OF NEW YORK
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
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In the Matter of JOSEPH GIARDINA from Action of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BEDFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT; MARK BETZ, as Assistant
Superintendent for Business; President of the Board MARK SLIVKA; Board Member BRAD SACKS; and Outside Auditor, COUGHLIN FOUNDOTOS CULLEN & DANOWSKI LLP.
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RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. Attorneys for Respondents 150 Motor Parkway, Suite 400 Hauppauge, NY 11788
(631) 261-8834
On the Brief: Lawrence W. Reich
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CONCLUSION
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Page
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ............................................................................................................... 1
POINT I - T11E COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION LACKS
JURISDICTION TO REMOVE THE SCHOOL RESPONDENTS ................................................... 2
POINT II - THE APPEAL IS UNTIMELY WITH RESPECT TO
SCI IOOL FISCAL YEARS PRIOR TO TILE 2004-05 SCHOOL FISCAL YEAR
AND IS PREMATURE WITH RESPECT TO THE 2005-06 SCI IOOL YEAR ......................... 6
PONT III - THE SCHOOL RESPONDENTS I IAVE NOT UNREASONABLY OVERFUNDED THE 2004-05 TAX CERTIORARI RESERVE FUND .............................................................................................. 9
POINT IV - TI 1E FAILURE OF THE TAX WARRANT TO CON FAIN THE
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RPTL §1318 IS A MERE TECHNICAL VIOLATION ... 15
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Page
Cases
Appeal of Aarseth. supra ........................................................................................ 3
Appeal of Golden, 45 Ed. Dept. Rep.____ ; Decision No. 15362 dated February 9, 2006...... 8
Appeal of Goldin. 43 Ed. Dept. Rep. 20 [2003 .................................................................................................... 12
Appeal of Ilubbard, 44 Ed. Dept. Rep. 183 (2004) ............................................................................................ 14
Appeal of Khalid, 40 Ed. Dept. Rep.____ Decision No. 14570 3
Appeal of Knapp, 41 Ed. Dept. Rep. 41 (2001) .......................................................................... 3
Appeal of Molineaux. 38 Ed. Dept. Rep. 672 [1999] ................................................................. 7
Appeal of Muench, 43 Ed. Dept. Rep. 419 [2004] ..................................................................... 6
Appeal of Schadtle, 40 Ed. Dept. Rep. 60 [20001; .................................................................... 6
Appeal of Schofield, 34 Ed. Dept. Rep. 143 [1994]) ................................................................. 3
Appeal of Silletti, 40 Ed. Dept. Rep. 426 (2000) ........................................................................ 3
Application of Morris, 35 Ed. Dept. Rep. 193 [1995] ................................................................ 4
Matter of Burke, 11 Ed. Dept. Rep. 275 [1972] ......................................................................... 5
Matter of Menella, 21 Ed. Dept. Rep. 721 [1982] ...................................................................... 5
Matter of Sobol. 14 Ed. Dept. Rep. 251 [1975] .......................................................................... 5
Other Authorities
Education Law §306 ...................................................................................................................... 2
Education Law §31 0 ..................................................................................................................... 3
Education Law. §3651, subd. 1-a ................................................................................................. 9
Real Property Tax Law. § 1318 ................................................................................................... 4
Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, §275.16 ......................................................... 10
Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, §277.1(b) .................................................... 2, 5
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant facts and circumstances concerning the establishment and funding of the tax certiorari tax reserve for the 2004-05 school fiscal year are set forth at length in the school respondents' Verified Answer, with exhibits. In the interest of brevity, the Commissioner is respectfully referred thereto.
POINT I
THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
LACKS
JURISDICTION TO REMOVE THE SCHOOL RESPONDENTS
Petitioner Giardina in his prayer for relief asks the Commissioner of Education to remove respondent Slivka from his position "as president of the Bedford Central School District Board of Education and to remove him from his position on the District's Finance Subcommittee". It is unclear whether petitioner Giardina also seeks his removal from the Board itself. Petitioner also seeks the removal of respondent Sacks "from his position on the Finance Subcommittee". Again, it is unclear whether the petitioner also seeks his removal from the Board.
An application to remove a school officer from a school office must be presented in accordance with the provisions of Education Law §306 and pursuant to Part 277 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education. Commissioner's Regulation §277.1(b) requires that the Notice of Petition in an application to remove a school officer must specifically advise the respondent that an application is being made for his or her removal from office. The form for such notice is prescribed by Section 277.1(b) of the Rules of Practice.
The caption of the within Petition does not indicate that its object is to secure the removal of school officers, nor was the Section 277.1(b) Notice included in the Petition which was served on the various school officers. Failure to follow the appropriate statutory and regulatory provisions mandates dismissal of that aspect of the Verified Petition which seeks the removal of
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Rep. 426 (2000).
Even had petitioner followed the appropriate procedure, there would nevertheless be no legal basis for the application to remove respondents Slivka and Sacks from their respective offices on the Board of Education. An application pursuant to Education Law §306 must demonstrate that a school officer has engaged in a "willful violation or neglect of duty". The
Commissioner has repeatedly interpreted this to require proof of "a purpose or intent to disregard a lawful duty or to violate a legal requirement". J. Mere negligence is insufficient (Appeal of Aarseth, supra; Appeal of Schofield, 34 Ed. Dept. Rep. 143 [1994]). In this case, the school officials relied upon the particular knowledge and expertise of the school business official and the District's external auditing firm for the legality of the establishment and funding of the tax certiorari reserve funds. There is no evidence whatsoever in
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Petitioner also seeks the removal of respondent Mark Betz "from his position as Superintendent of Business Administration in the Bedford Central School District due to willful deceptive practices". Once again, petitioner has failed to give appropriate jurisdictional notice of the application to remove. However, a more fundamental flaw to the application is that Mark Betz, in his capacity as Assistant Superintendent for Business, is a tenured school district employee, not a school officer for purposes of Education Law §306. The Commissioner of Education has previously held that the incumbent of the position of Assistant Superintendent of Schools for Business is a school employee and is not subject to removal pursuant to the provisions of Education Law §306 (Application of Morris, 35 Ed. Dept. Rep. 193 [19951). Furthermore, the Commissioner of Education stated therein that budgetary practices not in conformity with Real Property Tax Law §1318, without proof of an intentional violation of law, constitute an insufficient basis for removal of a school officer (See, also, Appeal of Aarseth, supra).
The Commissioner of Education also lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application to remove the firm of Coughlin Foundotos Cullen
86 Danowski, LLP as the District's external auditors. In addition to non-compliance with the notice requirements of §277.1(b), it is clear that the District's external auditors are not school officers within the purview of Education Law §306. By analogy to the numerous cases in which the Commissioner has declined to remove the school attorney, it is apparent that the District's external auditor is either an employee or an independent contractor (Matter of Menella, 21 Ed. Dept. Rep. 721 [1982]; Matter of Sobol, 14 Ed. Dept. Rep. 251 [1975j; Matter of Burke, 11 Ed. Dept. Rep. 275 [1972]) and not a school officer for purposes of Education Law §306.5
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THE APPEAL IS UNTIMELY WITH
RESPECT TO
SCHOOL FISCAL YEARS PRIOR TO THE 2004-05
SCHOOL FISCAL YEAR AND IS PREMATURE
WITH RESPECT TO THE 2005-06 SCHOOL YEAR
Petitioner Giardina seeks an Order from the Commissioner of Education directing respondents "to restate and correct all of the District's 2002-03, and 2003-04 tax certiorari reserves" and also seeks to stay the District's officials from developing a budget for the 2006-07 school year until after respondents have corrected all prior tax certiorari reserves. A stay seeking such relief was denied by the Commissioner. The appeal is untimely in some respects and is premature in others.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent school officials have improperly funded the 2002-03 and 2003-04 tax certiorari reserve funds. He contends that as a consequence of such improper retention, that the District has in fact retained funds in excess of the 2% limitation contained in RPTL §1318. RPTL §1318 requires that all unexpended operating funds in the undesignated fund balance in excess of 2% of the amount of the budget for the upcoming school year which have not been properly retained under other sections of law must be applied to reduce the upcoming tax levy.
It is well-settled that an appeal pursuant to pursuant to RPTL §1318(l) is timely only when brought within the fiscal year during which such unexpended surplus funds are improperly retained (Appeal of Muench, 43 Ed. Dept. Rep. 419 [2004]; Appeal of Schadtle, 40 Ed. Dept. Rep. 60 [2000]; Appeal of
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On July 14, 2005, respondent school officials established a tax certiorari reserve fund and directed that it be funded in an amount not to exceed $1,429,489 from undesignated surplus funds in the 2004-05 school district budget. On September 1, 2005, the date upon which the school tax levy was given to the tax collectors, the District's Assistant Superintendent for Business wrote to the District's external auditor to advise the firm that the tax certiorari reserve fund created by the resolution of July 14, 2005 should be funded in the amount of $1,310,000.
While Petitioner contends that the previous tax certiorari reserve funds were overfunded and that as a consequence thereof, the District improperly retained in excess of the 2% limitation for at least the past three school fiscal years, petitioner's allegations with respect to improper retention of surplus funds for prior school fiscal years are time-barred, since this appeal was not brought until January, 2006.
To the extent that the Petitioner seeks prospective relief addressed towards the 2006-07 budget, the appeal must be dismissed as speculative and premature (Appeal of Molineaux, supra). The Commissioner of Education will rule only on specific matters in controversy and will not entertain a request for an advisory opinion. Thus, in Appeal of Golden, 45 Ed. Dept. Rep.
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The Commissioner should dismiss as time-barred those aspects of the within appeal which relate to the creation and funding tax certiorari reserves for the 2002-03 and 2003-04 school years and should further dismiss those allegations relating to anticipated future improper actions as speculative.
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THE SCHOOL
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT UNREASONABLY
OVERFUNDED THE 2004-05 TAX CERTIORARI RESERVE FUND
Education Law, §3651, subd. 1-a provides as follows:
1-a. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of this section, any school district may establish a reserve fund for the payment of judgments and claims in tax certiorari proceedings in accordance with article seven of the real property tax law, without approval by the qualified voters of the district, provided, however, that the total of the monies held in such reserve fund shall not exceed that amount which might reasonably be deemed necessary to meet anticipated judgments and claims arising out of such tax certiorari proceedings. Any monies deposited to such reserve fund which are not expended for the payment of judgments or claims arising out of such tax certiorari proceedings for the tax roll in the year such monies are deposited to the said fund and/or which will not reasonably be required to pay any such judgment or claim shall be returned to the general fund on or before the first day of the fourth fiscal year following the deposit of such monies to said reserve fund.
Petitioner alleges that respondent school officials have substantially overfunded tax certiorari reserve funds for prior and for the current school fiscal year. He alleges that as a consequence thereof, the District has actuallyoverwithheld surplus funds, beyond the 2% limitation contained in RPTL §1318, and has failed to return such excess funds to the taxpayers through a reduced tax levy for the school fiscal years in question.
The Petition is untimely on its face with respect to tax certiorari reserves created for the 2002-03 and 2003-04 school fiscal years. As previously stated in Point II of this Memorandum, an appeal to the Commissioner predicated
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Petitioner challenges the funding of the 2004-05 tax certiorari reserve fund which was created in July, 2005 and was funded with undesignated surplus funds from the 2004-05 budget prior to the tax levy. Petitioner commenced the within appeal on January 26, 2006, well beyond the thirty day limitation set forth in Section 275.16 of the Commissioner's Regulations relating appeals to the Commissioner of Education (Title 8 NYCRR §275.16). Since petitioner has not established any good cause for his delay in initiating the within appeal until substantially beyond the thirty day limitation specified in the Rules of Practice, petitioner should not now be permitted to challenge either the creation or the funding of the 2004-05 tax certiorari reserve fund. If the challenge to the creation or funding of the reserve is untimely, then petitioner's claim that the District has overwithheld surplus funds in such fund in violation of the limitation contained in RPTL § 1318 must necessarily fail.
Education Law, Section 3651, subd. 1-a, which specifies the manner of creation and funding of tax certiorari reserve funds, is different in many significant respects from the statutory provisions relating to the creation and funding of capital reserve funds. Creation of a capital reserve fund requires voter approval; creation of a tax certiorari reserve fund does not. Expenditures from a capital reserve fund require voter approval; expenditures from a tax
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Education Law §3651, subd. 1(a) seems to suggest that there can only be separate tax certiorari reserve funds for the preceding three school fiscal years. The subdivision states that any monies deposited to such reserve fund "which are not expended for the payment of judgments or claims arising out of such tax certiorari proceedings for the tax roll in the year such monies are deposited to the said fund and/or which will not reasonably be required to pay any such judgment or claim shall be returned to the general fund on or before the first day of the fourth fiscal year following the deposit of such monies to said reserve fund". The use of the conjunctive "and/or" suggests that a tax certiorari reserve fund may indeed continue beyond the first day of the fourth fiscal year where the funds contained therein remain reasonably necessary to pay judgments or claims attributable to such prior school fiscal years.
We acknowledge the principle established in previous Commissioner's decisions that the proceeds of tax certiorari reserve funds are not fungible but must be used solely for tax certiorari proceedings for the tax roll in the specific year in such monies are deposited (Appeal of Goldin, 43 Ed. Dept. Rep. 20
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Respondent school district has not maintained any tax certiorari reserve fund for any school fiscal year prior to the 2002-03 school fiscal year. Indeed, the prior reserve fund which had been established for the 2001-02 school year was rolled into the general fund as part of the budget process for the 2004-05 school fiscal year. The District, however, has hundreds of thousands of dollars of potential refund liability attributable to school years for which there exists no current tax certiorari reserve fund. In addition, if percentages of recovery exceed predicted estimates, it is conceivable, and perhaps likely with respect to the 2003-04 school fiscal year, that refunds may actually exceed the amount maintained in the tax certiorari reserve funds for such school fiscal years, leaving the District unprotected to the extent of the shortfall of reserves against claims.
It should also be noted that no reserve has as yet been established for the 2005-06 school year. This will not normally occur until the District has ascertained available undesignated surplus funds from the 2005-06 budget.
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As the Commissioner of Education will note from the charts annexed as exhibits to the Verified Answer, that the District's experience over the last few years indicates both an acceleration in the number and amount of claims and also in the percentage of the reductions granted. If the District participates in settlement negotiations, it can to a significant degree allocate the refund
liability against the various years in question in such a manner as to provide greater coverage through its existing tax certiorari reserves. In this case, while it might at first blush appear that the 2004-05 tax certiorari reserve is funded at a higher level than might historically appear to be necessary, it is substantially likely that during the settlement process, a higher percentage of the allocation of refund liability would be directed toward the 2004-05 school tax roll, with lesser percentages allocated to prior school tax years.
It is essential to note that the District has not overwithheld surplus funds that would otherwise have gone back to the voters to reduce the tax levy. Even if the Commissioner of Education were to determine that respondent school officials had overwithheld funds in the 2004-05 tax certiorari reserve fund, such monies would nevertheless necessarily have had to be withheld,
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The Commissioner of Education has previously refused to direct the refunding of improperly created tax certiorari reserve funds. In Appeal of Hubbard, 44 Ed. Dept. Rep. 183 (2004), the Commissioner of Education saw no need to direct respondent to rescind a tax certiorari reserve fund which had been improperly established, because any amounts not required for tax certiorari judgments would necessarily be returned to the general fund. Furthermore, those cases in which the Commissioner of Education has found unintentional or technical violations of the 2% rule have uniformly provided only prospective relief by way of a direction to school officials to comply more scrupulously with the 2% limitation in the development of future budgets.
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THE FAILURE OF THE TAX WARRANT TO CONTAIN THE
STATEMENT
__ REQUIRED BY RPTL §1318 IS A MERE
TECHNICAL VIOLATION
RPTL §1318 states, insofar as pertinent, that the tax warrant to the collecting officer " . . . shall state the amount of unexpended surplus funds in the custody of the board and shall further state that except as authorized or required by law, such unexpended surplus funds have been applied in determining the amount of the school tax levy".
Respondent acknowledges that the tax warrants which the Board transmitted to the tax collectors of the various towns located within the school district did not contain the specific recitation required by RPTL §1318. However, any violation of the statute was merely technical and unintentional and had no effect whatsoever, since the Board did not in fact retain surplus operating funds in excess of the 2% limitation specified in RPTL §1318.
Respondent is now aware of its obligation to recite the language of the statute in its tax warrant, and no prospective direction from the Commissioner is necessary to assure future compliance thereunder.